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ABSTRACT 
An Empirical Investigation of Discrimination in the Hispanic 
Mortgage Market 
Gonzalo E. Martinez Metzler 
Junior College Degree, Northwest College, 1987 
B.A. Economics, University of New Mexico, 1989 
M.A. Economics, University of New Mexico, 1993 
This Master's Thesis empirically investigates whether 
Hispanics are discriminated against in the mortgage market. 
The use of the 1989 Metropolitan file of the American 
Housing Survey allows me to test the effects of borrower 
race and default risk in mortgage lending. The empirical 
analysis is based on a probit model of whether Hispanics, 
blacks and non-Hispanic whites households obtain FHA or 
conventional mortgages. FHA mortgages are fully insured and 
generally require a lower downpayment, but are typically 
more expensive. Given a choice between FHA and conventional 
mortgages, borrowers will prefer the relatively cheaper 
conventional mortgages. Therefore, households obtaining FHA 
mortgages will tend to be rationed in the conventional 
market. After controlling for various socioeconomic 
iii 
characteristics any remaining race effect in the probit 
model may be reflective of events unrelated to default risk. 
Results from this investigation indicate that the likelihood 
of Hispanics obtaining FHA mortgages is not significantly 
different from that of white households. However, blacks are 
more likely to obtain FHA loans than Hispanic and white 
borrowers. These results suggest that Hispanics are not 
rationed as are blacks in the conventional mortgage market. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Housing Act of 1949 established as a national goal 
the provision of "a decent home and suitable living 
environment for every American family." Recent estimates, 
however, show that Hispanics as a whole are less likely to 
own homes and pay more for homes of similar quality than do 
comparable Anglos {Krivo, 1986) . Recent studies on Hispanic 
housing issues also show that mortgages given to Hispanics 
are on the average more expensive than those given to white 
households {U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1983). Two competing 
explanations for these findings come to mind. Hispanic 
households may be excluded from the conventional mortgage 
market because of their relatively lower income levels, 
and/or because mortgage loan officers statistically 
discriminate against Hispanics because they associate a 
relative high rate of default to this group. 
The literature has mostly studied the housing market 
discrimination of blacks. For example, economic research on 
minority home ownership suggests that black households are 
less likely to obtain conventional financing than whites, 
even after controlling for various proxies of default risk 
{Gabriel and Rosenthal, 1991). A recently released study by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston agrees with this work 
{Munnell et al.,l992). The studies that have addressed the 
1 
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problems of Hispanic home ownership have done so assuming 
that housing market experience of blacks and Hispanics is 
the same. This assumption is problematic in that it has been 
found that the market experience of blacks and Hispanics is 
not necessarily equal, most notably in labor-market 
discrimination studies (e.g. Reimers, 1983; Cotton, 1988). 
The purpose of this Master's thesis is to empirically 
investigate whether Hispanics are discriminated against in 
the housing market. Of course, it would appear housing 
discrimination does exist for Hispanics. But, does this 
finding hold up after account is taken of non-discrimination 
factors? 
The use of the 1989 Metropolitan file of the American 
Housing Survey (AHS} will allow me to test the effects of 
borrower race and default risk in mortgage lending for 
Hispanics, blacks, and non-Hispanic whites across the 
nation. Consistent with Gabriel and Rosenthal's (1991) 
mortgage lending study that used FHA mortgages as a proxy 
for default risk, the empirical analysis is based on a 
probit model of whether Hispanics, blacks and non-Hispanic 
whites borrowers obtain FHA or conventional mortgages 1 • 
1 FHA offers 5% downpayment loans while most conventional 
lenders require at least 10%. FHA, however, also requires a 
3.8% mortgage insurance premium, whereas conventional 
mortgages with a loan-to-value ratios above 80% generally 
require less private mortgage insurance, and those loans with 
ratios below 80% do not require mortgage insurance. 
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FHA mortgages are fully insured and generally require a 
lower downpayment, but are typically more expensive. Given a 
choice between FHA and conventional loans, households will 
prefer the relatively cheaper conventional loans. 
Therefore, Hispanic households obtaining FHA mortgages 
will tend to be credit constrained in the conventional 
market. After controlling for various socioeconomic 
characteristics of Hispanic households, any remaining race 
effect in the probit model may be reflective of events 
unrelated to default risk. 
The thesis is organized as follows: The relevant 
literature on housing discrimination is discussed in Chapter 
I. A statistical background on the Hispanic housing problems 
is presented in Chapter II. The analytical framework to test 
for the existence of credit discrimination in the Hispanic 
mortgage market is given in Chapter III. Data and variables 
descriptions are given in Chapter IV. Results, and 
conclusions are presented in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. 
Appendix I introduces a theoretical model that explains the 
impact of collateral requirements on credit rationing. In 
Appendix II, variables description and statistical results 
are presented, followed by the references. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) created by the 
. enactment of the National Housing Act of 1934, and the 
Veterans Administration's (VA) loan programs authorized by 
the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 were designed to 
increase homeownership rates among middle income households. 
By insuring the mortgages against default, these two federal 
programs decrease the default risk to a lender thus making 
mortgages available at lower interest rates, for longer 
periods of time and with lower monthly payments to the 
borrower. 
FHA loans are available to all households and are fully 
insured carrying mortgages insurance premiums equal to 3.8% 
of loan value. Also, the FHA requires a minimum 3% to 5% 
downpayment, and limits the loan size to a ceiling which 
varies from$ 67,500 to$ 124,875 for cities with high 
housing costs. On the other hand, conventional lending 
institutions normally require mortgage insurance only to 
loans with less than 20% downpayment (U.S. GPO, 1990). 
The VA Loan Guaranty Program provides housing credit 
only to veterans and service personnel. VA loans are 
guaranteed to a maximum of $27,500 in the case of default. 
Additionally, the minimum downpayment ratio required by VA 
loans in many cases is set to zero. For example in fiscal 
year 1981 over 67% of the veterans purchasing a home with a 
guaranteed loan were able to obtain zero downpayment loans. 
Also, VA mortgages require mortgage insurance at only 1% of 
loan value, but entail no other cost to the household 
(Veterans Administration, 1982). 
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Consistent with the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model of 
credit rationing, borrowers identified as having a higher 
probability or cost of default on the basis of race, income, 
location or wealth, should be subject to tighter credit 
constraints and hence be more likely to obtain non-
conventional mortgages, ceteris paribus. The empirical 
evidence reveals that the relative number of government 
insured mortgages increases in periods of increasing default 
risk, as lenders tighten non-price constraints on 
conventional loans (Duca and Rosenthal, 1991). 
Also, recent studies of racial discrimination in 
mortgage markets suggest that minority households are 
disadvantaged in terms of (1) mortgage credit availability 
(Garza, 1983), (2) the likelihood of minorities owning homes 
(Krivo, 1986), (3) racial choices in urban residential 
location (Gabriel and Rosenthal, 1989) and (4) the share of 
aggregate housing wealth owned by minority households (Long 
and Caudill, 1992). Race could also have an impact on the 
credit standards for minority borrowers if the expected 
default cost for minorities exceed that of white borrowers 
6 
(Yinger, 1986) 2 • 
In addition, extant research suggests that Veterans' 
Administration (VA) and conventional mortgage holders have a 
significantly different demand responsiveness for housing; 
that marginal changes in credit constraints affect housing 
demand; and that the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) 
lending mitigates the effect of mortgage constraints 
(Rosenthal, et al., 1991). 
In terms of racial segregation in the urban housing 
market, the evidence on the effect of household socio-
economic and demographic characteristics on residential 
location indicates that while the location choice of non-
Hispanic whites is sensitive to changes in socio-economic 
and demographic characteristics, blacks' location patterns 
are little influenced by large simulated changes in 
household characteristics. This result may reflect the 
absence of racial discrimination against non-Hispanic white 
households in the housing market, which would allow for a 
wider residential location choice for white relative to 
black families (Gabriel and Rosenthal, 1989). 
While FHA loans have helped Hispanics purchase their 
own homes, the cost associated with it in the form of higher 
2 Indeed, these housing problems might provide the basis 
for other forms of segregation, and can mean distress along 
several fronts such as health, safety and transportation that 
could lead to disadvantages in employment, educational 
opportunities and economic stability (Lopez, 1986). 
interest rates has been high. The evidence of the impact of 
the FHA loan program on Hispanic mortgages shows that 64.8 
percent of Hispanic families have FHA mortgages secured 
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through federal entities as compared to 40.6 percent of non-
Hispanic white households, and the median length of FHA 
loans made to Hispanics is about equal to that of white 
households, 30.1 versus 30.2 years (Lopez, 1986). 
Table 1~ Percent Distribution of Hispanic and Non-Hispanic 
White First Mortgage Interest Rates by Mortgage Type, 1981. 
Hispanic Non-Hispanic White 
Interest Rate % FHA VA Conventional FHA VA conventional 
Less than 6.0 15.2 21.5 3.6 34.4 25.8 6.7 
6.0 to 7.9 26.8 19.2 18.9 21.4 21.5 24.1 
8.0 to 9.9 39.3 52.3 50.6 28.2 38.0 46.4 
10.0 to 11.9 11.7 5.2 18.0 11.8 10.8 14.0 
12 or more 7.0 1.7 8.9 4.2 3.9 8.8 
source: L6pez, Manuel M., •su casa noes mi casa ... ,· (1986): 133. 
The data in Table 1 reveal that 58% of Hispanics 
receiving FHA loans paid an interest rate above 8% compared 
to 44.2% for non-Hispanic whites. The higher mortgag,e 
interest rates paid by Hispanic households could be 
explained if there is price discrimination against Hispanics 
by conventional lending institutions or Hispanics had a 
higher demand for mortgages than whites during the late 
1970's and early 1980's, a period of volatile interest 
rates. However, the data in Table 2 indicate that only 63.3 
percent of all FHA mortgages to Hispanic households are 
post-1970, for non-Hispanic whites this percentage is 82.5 
percent. 
Table 2. Percent Distribution of Year First Mortgage was 
Assumed by Hispanics and non-Hispanic Whites by Mortgage 
Type, 1981. 
Hispanics Non-Hispanic Whites 
Year Assumed FHA VA conventional FHA VA Conventional 
1975-1981 44.0 54.1 63.8 55.5 61.1 68.3 
1970-1974 19.3 16.2 19.4 27.0 11.6 20.2 
1965-1969 16.3 11.0 10.2 7.4 14.0 7.2 
1960-1964 14.2 10.8 5.7 5.5 9.3 3.1 
1959 or earlier 6.2 7.9 0.8 4.7 4.1 1.2 
source: L6pez, Manuel M., •su casa noes mi casa ... ,• (1986): 134. 
In 1980, the Veterans Administration's loan program 
accounted for 17.0 percent of all Hispanic primary 
mortgages. The 1980 census shows that VA mortgages have a 
median life of 30.2 years for Hispanic as well for white 
households, and data in Table 1 indicate that 14.7 percent 
of all VA mortgages made to whites and only 6.9 percent for 
Hispanics have an interest rate above 10 percent. This 
higher interest rate paid by white households can be 
explained by the recency of non-Hispanic white's VA 
mortgages. About 61 percent of all VA mortgages to non-
8 
Hispanic white households were made between 1975 and 1981, 
when mortgage interest rates averaged 11.3%, for Hispanics 
this percentage is only 54 percent. 
Moreover, the evidence reported by the Census Bureau 
shows that during the 1970's a larger percentage of non-
Hispanic whites than Hispanic households have been able to 
afford the increasing expense of home ownership. The 
Hispanics home ownership rate dropped from 46.2 percent in 
1970 to 43.3 percent in 1980. The drop in the Hispanic home 
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ownership rate can be explained by the fact that the average 
cost of new housing increased by 134.1 percent, and that for 
existing units by 133.0 percent between 1972 and 1982, while 
Hispanic households income rose by only 77.8 percent as 
compared to 83.7 for whites (U.S. HUD, 1989}. 
Table 3. Percent Distribution of Hispanic and non-Hispanic 
White Price/Income Ratios for Home Purchases 1977-1981 by 
Mortgage Type. 
Hispanic Non-Hispanic White 
Price/Income ratio Total FHA VA conv Total FHA VA Conv 
Less than 1.0 10.9 8.0 5.1 13.0 11.8 10.4 7.9 11.5 
1. 0 to 1. 9 35.5 26.5 64.4 33.0 45.6 48.2 49.3 47.4 
2.0 to 2.9 27.9 32.7 25.4 27.8 26.4 28.6 29.0 26.1 
3.0 to 3.9 11.1 18.6 5.1 10.4 9.0 7.1 7.5 9.0 
4 or more 14.6 14.2 0.0 15.9 7.2 5.7 6.3 6.0 
Source: L6pez, Manuel M., •su casa noes mi casa ... , • (1986): 132. 
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In Table 3, the data show that in the late 1970's, 26 
percent of Hispanics households had purchased homes that 
were priced three or more times greater than their annual 
income as compare to only 16.2 percent for non-Hispanics 
white households. This means that either Hispanics were 
buying larger homes, or that they had to allocate a larger 
proportion of their annual income to purchase housing units 
of equal worth. 
Most conventional lending institutions do not dispute 
the existences of a racial gap in mortgage lending. Banks, 
thrift and mortgage companies attribute this gap to the 
lending guidelines of the agencies that buy mortgages to be 
repackaged into securities. For example, the working poor 
can afford houses only in neighborhoods that lenders fear 
the secondary mortgage market will regard as ris~. If so, 
the lender can not recover the money to lend again. Mortgage 
size is a similar obstacle. Besides the difficulty of 
reselling small mortgages, banks find them unappealing 
because small loans take just as much work as larger ones, 
yet only manage to put a little of the bank's money to work. 
In 1991 the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(Fannie Mae), a private federally charted corporation, 
purchased or guaranteed$ 139 billion or 584,000 home 
mortgages from more than 1,500 mortgage lenders. However, 
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only 2.5% of these mortgages were originated in 
neighborhoods in which 80% of the residents were members of 
minority groups. Moreover, Fannie Mae refused to buy loans 
in blocks smaller than $ 25,000; most lenders took that to 
mean they could not sell Fannie Mae an individual loan below 
$ 25,000. In 1991, Fannie Mae abandoned its minimum loan 
size requirement (Thomas, 1992). 
The data presented in this chapter suggest that 
Hispanic households are at a disadvantage, relative to non-
Hispanic Whites, in terms of home ownership rate, the 
percentage of their income devoted to housing and in the 
mortgage interest rate paid. Also, mortgage lending 
institutions argued that the guidelines of the agencies that 
buy mortgages to be repacked into securities tend to 
increase the racial gap in mortgage lending. The analytical 
framework to address the above issues and to test for the 
existence of credit rationing in the mortgage market is 
presented 1n the following chapter. 
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III. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO TEST FOR THE EXISTENCE OF 
CREDIT RATIONING IN THE BLACK MORTGAGE MARKET 
Black households could face tighter credit constraints 
in the conventional mortgage market because of their 
relatively lower income levels, housing preferences and/or 
their perceived relatively high rate of default. 
Utility maximization theory suggests that households 
will maximize their utility by choosing their preferred 
combination of tenure status and quantity of housing subject 
to a given set of prices, income and credit constraints. The 
following model shows how the perceived default risk of a 
group could displace this group into the FHA market. 
Housing 
Goods 
I I 
I 
I 
- ,. -1- -
I I 
I I 
Figure 1. Levels of Housing/Non-housing Goods 
Consumption Under Credit Rationing. 
In figure 1, the budget line shows the different 
combinations of housing and non-housing consumption levels 
for a household with income (I). The vertical intercept 
(!/Ph) and the horizontal intercept (I/Pnh) represent the 
maximum amount of housing and non-housing units that could 
be obtained if only one of the two alternatives was 
consumed3 • If there are no credit constraints, households 
could freely choose the housing level that would maximize 
their utility. That is, for households that highly prefer 
13 
housing to other goods the optimal level of housing and non-
housing consumption would be at H1 and NH1 where their 
indifference curve (A) is tangent to the budget constraint; 
and for household with relatively lower housing preferences 
(indifference curve C) their optimal level of housing and 
non-housing consumption would be at point H2 and NH2 , 
respectively. 
In the presence of credit rationing, however, 
3 Housing is assumed to be a normal good. That is, as 
household income increases, the amount of housing units 
consumed also increases. An indifference curve is a line 
connecting all combination of housing and non-housing goods 
that are equally desirable to the household. The indifference 
curves are assumed to be downward sloping and convex to the 
origin. The slope of the indifference curves, or the marginal 
rate of substitution refers to the maximum amount of non-
housing units a household is willing to give up in exchange 
for one more unit of housing which increases at a decreasing 
rate. As long as the household desires more of housing and 
non-housing units, every point on a curve farther from the 
origin will be preferred to any point on a lower indifferent 
curve. 
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households with housing preferences above point Z that are 
perceived by the conventional market as risky investments 
because of their current income level, their higher housing 
preferences and/or their race would be displaced into the 
FHA mortgage market. Given the additional mortgage cost 
associated with the insurance premium required by the FHA 
market, households that are displaced into the FHA market 
would face the budget line represented by I/PM-Z-I/PfM· The 
lower vertical intercept I/Pfha represents the maximum amount 
of housing goods that could be obtained, by a credit 
rationed household, in the FHA market if only housing goods 
were consumed. Since credit rationed households are also 
constrained by a maximum share of income that they can spend 
on housing, they would also be displaced to a lower 
indifference curve (B) that yields a lower housing 
consumption level (H3 ) • 
This theoretical development, however, does not explain 
why banks would ration credit to Hispanics. Basic supply and 
demand laws tell us that if demand for loans exceeds the 
supply of loans, interest rates will increase thus reducing 
the quantity demanded or increasing the supply of loans 
until demand and supply are equated at a new equilibrium 
interest rate. According to this principle there is no 
reason for credit rationing to exist. Several explanations, 
however, exist. In the short run credit rationing can be 
15 
viewed as a temporary disequilibrium caused by an exogenous 
shock. During this period lagged interest rate adjustments 
allow for credit rationing (Goodwin, 1986) . Long term credit 
rationing could be explained by government interventions in 
the mortgage markets such as the imposition of usury laws 
(Smith, 1983), and in mortgage markets with imperfect 
information, it is difficult for banks to distinguish low 
risk borrowers from riskier borrowers, and to do so the 
banks use a variety of screening devices (Bester, 1985) 4 • 
That is, the interest rate a borrower agrees to pay and 
the collateral requirement determined by the banks act as a 
function of the perceived risk of borrowers. When lending 
institutions are faced with an excess demand for loans at a 
given rate, banks could increase the lending rate or 
increase the collateral requirement to accommodate this 
excess demand. However, why do banks prefer to ration credit 
than to increase the lending rate, the supply of funds or 
the collateral requirement when there is an excess demand 
for loans? 
In figure 2, the loan offer curve for minorities 
4 
"Usury restrictions limit the availability of credit. 
Studies have found that the average number of loans and the 
dollar amount of loans are substantially lower in low-ceiling 
states than in high ceiling states. In states where free 
market is above the ceiling, the poor, the transient, the 
young and those with large families are rationed out of the 
credit market first, since financial institutions must utilize 
nonprice methods to decrease risk and increase effective 
yields" {U.S. GPO, 1980). 
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L=S(Rc) that maximizes the bank's expected profits and the 
minority's demand for loans curve L=D(Rc) are expressed as a 
function of the loan rate, Rc· If minorities are perceived 
as a higher default risk group, then the minorities loan 
offer would be lower than the overall market offer curve 
L=S (Rem) 5 • 
l .. D 
Z< 
0 R\. Rc 
Figure 2. Loan Demand and Loan Offer curves. 
The household demand for loans curve L = D(Rc) is 
5 The loan offer curve is derived in Appendix I. This 
loan offer function has the following properties: ( 1) the loan 
amount (L) equals zero when the return of an alternative 
investment (~) is greater than the loan rate Rc; (2} if ~ = 
Rb, then the bank is indifferent between extending the loan 
and investing on the alternative investment and (3) the loan 
amount (L) approaches zero as the contracted (Rc) goes to 
infinity. That is, the probability of default increases as Rc 
increases thus reducing the bank's expected profits (Jaffee 
and Mopigliani, 1969). 
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inversely related to the loan rate. That is, as the interest 
rate increases the quantity of mortgages demanded decreases. 
Minority borrowers will be rationed in the amount indicated 
by {Z) if the optimal market loan rate, say Rem' is less 
than Rc because the bank's optimum loan offer for minorities 
lies below the minority's demand curve. Lending institutions 
would not ration credit if there were not legal restrictions 
on the loan rate they could charge to different individuals. 
However, legal restrictions, and considerations of good will 
and mores, and rate fixing agreements among banks make it 
almost impossible for lending institutions to charge 
significantly different rates to different customers. 
Why, when faced with excess demand for loans, would not 
banks increase their collateral requirements thus reducing 
the demand for funds and the risk of default, and increasing 
the returns to the bank? 
Theoretical models that explain the impact of 
collateral requirements on credit rationing suggest that in 
the bank's view an increase in collateral requirements has 
two effects on the mortgage market: {1) households that 
decided to stay in the market will choose less expensive 
homes, and {2) low risk, less wealthy potential home buyers 
will drop out of the mortgage market. The increased 
collateral requirement could significantly increase the 
second effect, thus decreasing the bank's expected returns 
18 
{Wette, 1983) 6 • 
Hispanic borrowers who are denied loans could not 
obtain a loan even if they indicated a wiliness to pay more 
than the advertised interest rate, or to put up more 
collateral than is demanded. If banks increased the interest 
rate or the collateral requirements, low risk Hispanic home 
buyers could drop out of the mortgage market. Thus, the risk 
on the bank's loan portfolio could increase possibly 
decreasing the bank's expected profits. Moreover, credit 
rationing would exist if banks limit the number of loans 
that they will make, rather than limiting the size of each 
loan, or relating the interest charged to the loan size. 
The credit rationing theory presented in this chapter 
suggests that Hispanic households could be rationed in the 
conventional credit market because of their relatively lower 
income levels, higher housing preferences and/or their race. 
Also, this theory suggests that households that are 
displaced into the relatively more expensive FHA mortgage 
market would face a relatively lower housing consumption 
level. The empirical model needed to investigate whether 
Hispanics are discriminated against in the housing market is 
presented in the following chapter. 
6 The theoretical model is presented in Appendix I. 
IV. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL, DATA AND VARIABLES DEFINITION 
Data for the analysis are taken from the 1989 
Metropolitan file of the American Housing Survey (MAHS), 
which contains individual respondent records in 11 
metropolitan areas7 • This data set has been widely used in 
previous housing studies and provides the best detailed 
housing and socio-economic data on households across the 
19 
nation. The only shortcoming of using the MARS data is that 
it does not provide information on whether the household 
that holds a FHA secured mortgage had been previously denied 
a conventional mortgage, or if the household had only 
applied to FHA mortgages because he/she perceived the 
conventional mortgage market as being unfriendly. 
An alternative source of housing information is the 
Horne Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data. However, the HMDA 
data only provides one piece of economic information about 
the applicant, income. Given the choice in data sets, the 
MAHS data was selected for this study because its provides a 
complete socio-economic description of households' 
characteristics across the nation. 
To reduce measurement errors only those households that 
purchased their homes between 1980 and 1989 and obtained 
7 The 11 Metropolitan areas are: Boston, Dallas, Detroit, 
Fort Worth, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Phoenix, 
San Francisco, Tampa and Washington D.C. 
newly originated conventional or FHA mortgages were 
selected. From the original sample of 36,000 records only 
3,779 were selected. 
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The Gabriel and Rosenthal model is used here, augmented 
by a measure of permanent income and transitory income, 
because households could borrow against their future income 
thus spreading housing consumption cost over time according 
to their expected permanent income. The empirical analysis 
1s based on a probit model of whether Hispanic borrowers 
obtain fully insured Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or 
conventional mortgage financing. 
Consistent with Stiglitz-Weiss model of credit 
rationing, Hispanic households perceived as high risk 
borrowers should be subject to credit constraint and be more 
likely to obtain FHA financing, ceteris paribus. 
The probit model is given by: 
FHA=u0 +u1 logYP+u2 logYt+u3 CITY+u4 RAR+u 5 BLACK 
+u6 HISPANIC+u1AGEl+U8~+u9 SEX+ei (1) 
where: Yp and Yt are measures of permanent and transitory 
incomes, respectively. CITY is the identifier for central 
city location; HAR is the housing price appreciation rate; 
AGEl, BLACK, HISPANIC, MAR and SEX are the age, race, 
marital status and sex of the household head; and ao, a1 , ~, 
a 3 , a 4 , a 5 , a 6 , ~, a 8 and a 9 are coefficients. The error term 
21 
(ei) is assumed to have a normal distribution and finite 
variance. 
The dependent variable in the probit model equals 1 if 
the household obtained a FHA loan and 0 if it obtained a 
conventional loan. Gabriel and Rosenthal used a measure of 
household wealth (housing downpayment plus all liquid 
assets) to test for the likelihood of binding conventional 
downpayment constraints. However, most housing analysts 
suggest that some form of long-term income variable, which 
has a wealth component in it, is a principal determinant of 
housing tenure choice. That is, households look beyond their 
current income and wealth level in making their housing 
decisions. Households could borrow against future incomes to 
spread out housing consumption over time consistent with 
their expected permanent income (Goodman and Kawai, 1984; 
Goodman, 1988; Cameron, 1986). 
Moreover, mortgage payments-to-income ratios are also 
an important tool of non-price credit rationing. Given that 
the preferred budget share of housing declines with 
household's income, then conventional payments-to-income 
ratio constraints will be relatively more binding for lower-
income families 8 • Since FHA payments-to-income standards 
are less restrictive than conventional criteria, 
8 Carliner (1973) finds that the income elasticity for 
housing demand is less than 1 , which means that the preferred 
budget share of housing declines with income. 
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then we can expect that lower-income families will favor FHA 
financing. 
Using the method presented by Goodman and Kawai {1982), 
the following regression equation was estimated to construct 
the permanent and transitory components of measured income: 
Y1 =C¥ 0 +C¥1 EDUC+m2 SEX+ +C¥3 EXP+m4 EXP2 
+C¥5 MAR+a6 HISPANIC+t17 BIACK+W1 (2) 
where EDUC and EXP are measures of human wealth. EXP2 is 
included to capture nonlinear effects of this variable on 
permanent income. Sex, marital status (MAR) and race (BLACK 
or HISPANIC) indicate other human and non-human wealth 
variables for each household head. These dummy variables 
equal 1 if the household head is Hispanic or black, female, 
and married and equal 0 otherwise. Wi is the disturbance 
term uncorrelated with the explanatory variables so that the 
OLS estimation procedure provides consistent and efficient 
estimators. 
The signs of the coefficients are expected to be: 
a 1 > 0 , a 2 < 0 1 a 3 > 0 1 a 4 < 0 1 a 5 >0 1 a 6 < 0 and a 7 < 0 
The predicted value of Yi can be interpreted as the 
estimate for permanent income (YP), and the predicted value 
of wi as the estimate for transitory income {Yt) . 
The dummy variable CITY equals 1 if the house is 
located within the central city of a metropolitan area an 0 
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otherwise. Central city locations are usually identified 
with urban decay that may be associated with lower housing 
appreciation rates. Vandell and Thibodeau (1985) have shown 
that neighborhood quality is a significant predictor of loan 
default rate. Therefore, central city location should be 
positively related to the probability of obtaining FHA 
mortgage financing. 
Lenders expectations of annual home appreciation rate 
(HAR) also affect lender exposure to default risk, because 
low rates of home appreciation depress the rate of 
collateralization on the loan. We can expect that 
conventional lenders would impose stricter downpayment 
constraints to households buying in areas with lower 
appreciation home rates to insure that mortgages are fully 
collateralized. In comparison, FHA lending procedures 
prohibit the use of property location as a factor of loan 
evaluation. This implies that households locating in areas 
of low housing appreciation rates ~auld be more likely to 
obtain FHA mortgages. The home appreciation rate (HAR) was 
entered into the probit model as the house annual rate of 
appreciation from the time the household purchased the 
property to the time of the survey (1989) 9 • 
Households are described by the following demographic 
9 HAR = (VALUE/ PPRICE) 1190-buyyear Where VALUE is the 
estimated property value in 1989; PPRICE is the price paid for 
the property and buyyear is the year property was purchased. 
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variables: (1) Assuming that credit history, credit 
worthiness and the likelihood of owning increases with age, 
conventional lenders may apply more flexible credit 
constraints to older households, increasing their likelihood 
of obtaining a conventional loan. 
(2) Household head race is defined by the HISPANIC and 
BLACK 0-1 dummy variables and equal 1 if the household head 
race is Hispanic or black respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
Generally, minority households are associated with lower 
levels of income and wealth than white households, and 
minorities tend to be concentrated in central city locations 
subject to lower housing appreciation rates. Also, as racial 
discrimination persists in the labor market, non-whites are 
more likely to suffer layoffs or other income shocks (Kain 
and Quingley, 1975; Gabriel and Walch, 1984). 
(3) MAR and (4) SEX are also dummy variables. Both 
equal 1 if the household head is female and married and 0 
otherwise. These two variables are used to account for the 
possibility that different family types may have different 
underlying preferences for tenure choice. 
These differences suggest that the expected default 
risk on a mortgage issued to a minority would be greater 
than for a non-Hispanic white household. Consistent with 
Stiglitz and Weiss, conventional lenders are expected to 
apply tighter credit constraints to minority applicants. 
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Given that various proxies for default risk and cost 
have been fully integrated into the model, any remaining 
race effects would reflect one of two possibilities: the 
proxies for default risk and cost do not fully capture 
lender evaluations of individuals default risk, or household 
race is an important factor determining the type of mortgage 
minority households obtain for reasons other than default 
risk. The results from the empirical analysis, of the impact 
of household race and other socio-economic characteristics 
on the type of mortgage a household obtain, are presented in 
the next chapter. 
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V. RESULTS 
The permanent and transitory incomes, and the probit 
model were estimated from the complete sample of 3767 home 
buyers from 1980 through 1989 in 11 metropolitan areas. The 
variables used in all the estimations are listed and fully 
described in Table 1. All variables refer to the head of the 
household. 
The sample data statistics are presented in Table 2. 
The total sample consists of 3316 non-Hispanic white, 230 
black and 221 Hispanic households with a mean age of 39 
years. With a mean income of $52,088, households in the 
sample are well above the 1988 national average household 
income of $32,191. This limits the study to the upper 
middle income population excluding those households that are 
at or below national average, for whom discrimination in the 
mortgage market could be more intense. 
The first column of table 3 reports the coefficients 
and t-values associated with each variable in the permanent 
and transitory incomes linear estimation. The second column 
reports the results from the logarithmic estimates. The 
t-statistics 1n parentheses indicates the statistical 
significance of the coefficient. 
All the coefficients in the estimated permanent and 
transitory incomes function have the expected sign, and are 
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statistically significant with the exception of the race 
variables- HISPANIC and BLACK. The education, experience and 
marital status variables reflect the positive returns to 
income of each variable. The gender variable, SEX, has the 
expected negative sign which reflects that females earnings 
are lower than comparable males. Although, the signs of the 
coefficients for the race variables are negative, their low 
t-statistic may be reflective of the higher income and 
education characteristics of the sample. 
In Tables 4 and 5, the regression estimates and the 
estimates of the probit model for minorities (Hispanics and 
blacks combined) indicate that variables which proxy for 
lenders' concern over default risk have the expected effect 
on the type of loan that minorities obtain. The permanent 
and transitory income coefficients are negative and 
statically significant which indicates that as income 
increases the probability of obtaining an FHA loan 
decreases. 
Similarly, the estimated coefficients of the annual 
housing appreciation rate (HAR), central city location 
(CITY) and age (AGEl) are of the expected sign and are 
statistically significant. These estimates indicate that 
younger households buying houses located in central city 
location, characterized by lower appreciation rates, are 
more likely to obtain FHA mortgages. The marital status 
(MAR) and gender (SEX) variables are not statistically 
significant. 
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The estimated coefficient for the race (MINORITY) 
variable is of the expected sign (positive) and is 
statistically significant (3.86). This indicates that even 
after controlling for various proxies that control for 
lender perception of default risk, minorities are relatively 
more likely to obtain FHA mortgages than comparable 
non-Hispanic white households. 
Despite our choice of a different data source in this 
study, the results are consistent with Gabriel and 
Rosenthal's study that finds that the race effect for blacks 
has an important impact on the type of loan they obtain. 
However, when blacks and Hispanics are entered separately 
into the model the estimated impact of the individual race 
on the type of mortgage obtained is substantially different. 
In Tables 6 and 7, the regression estimates and the 
estimates of the probit model for blacks and for Hispanic 
households reveal that when the two groups are independently 
entered into the equations, the race effect increases for 
black household and for Hispanics it disappears. That is, 
black households are more likely to face tighter credit 
constraints in the conventional mortgage market thus 
increasing their probability of obtaining a FHA mortgage 
relative to comparable Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites. 
Although the estimated coefficients for the HISPANIC 
variable in these models are negative (-.02), they are not 
statistically significant (-.52 and -.69 for the liner and 
logarithmic equations respectively). Therefore, the race 
variable for Hispanics, relative to non-Hispanic white 
households, does not have a significant effect on the 
probability of obtaining an FHA mortgage. 
Furthermore, the results presented in Tables 8 and 9, 
suggest that the impact of black's race on the probability 
of obtaining a FHA loan, relative to Hispanic households, 
remains positive and statistically significant. 
29 
30 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical results presented in this Master's thesis 
suggest that socio-economic variables which proxy for 
lender's concerns about default risk and cost have an 
important effect on the type of mortgages borrowers obtain. 
These results are consistent with previous studies of 
mortgage lending discrimination that have found that blacks 
are less likely to obtain conventional financing than 
whites, even after controlling for socio-economic proxies 
for default risk {Gabriel and Rosenthal, 1991), and that 
blacks and Hispanics as a whole face higher denial rates ~n 
the conventional mortgage market than comparable 
non-Hispanic white households {Munnell et al., 1992). 
Also, these findings are consistent with the 
theoretical model of credit rationing developed by Stiglitz 
and Weiss {1981), and provide one more piece of evidence on 
the credit rationing behavior -based on perceived 
differences in borrowers' default risk and cost- of 
conventional lending institutions. 
The results of this study, however, suggest that when 
the race effect of Hispanic and black households is 
separately analyzed Hispanic households do not face credit 
rationing, proxied by the likelihood of obtaining a FHA 
mortgage, in the conventional mortgage market . These 
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results in no way suggest that all Hispanic sub-groups are 
not in disadvantage in terms of conventional mortgage 
availability, but given that the data used in this study 
categorized Hispanics of all origins together, a comparison 
among distinct Hispanic sub-groups could not be made. 
Further research is recommended to determine if these 
results hold among various Hispanic groups e.g. Mexican-
American, Cuban, Puerto Rican, and others. 
Selective policy recommendations could be formulated 
once research on the Hispanic mortgage market, at the 
subgroup level, is conducted. For the moment, policy that 
targets all Hispanics is not recommended because it may not 
serve those Hispanic subgroups that are presently at a 
greater disadvantage. 
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APPENDIX I 
Consider Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) investment model 
with credit rationing to explain why among loan applicants 
that appear to be identical some receive a loan and others 
do not; even if (1) the rejected applicants agree to pay a 
higher interest rate and to put up more collateral than the 
rate and amount advertised by the bank, and (2) the supply 
of credit increases to accommodate any excess demand for 
loans. 
Let's assume that a profit maximizing bank has 
identified two households, a non-Hispanic white and a 
Hispanic, that (1) want to buy a house costing a 
predetermined amount of money (C), (2) would pay a mortgage 
rate (Rc) and (3) would get a loan amount (L). In the bank's 
view the riskiness of each mortgage can not be ascertained 
and to simplify the model a one period mortgage is assumed. 
However, the bank perceives non-Hispanic whites as a 
risk-free group and Hispanics as a members of a risky group. 
That is, the ability of both households to met all of their 
mortgage payments (x) may take a value between q and Q with 
the probabilities indicated in Figure 1 by the bell-shaped 
curve, and the Hispanic household probability of default 
indicated by the shaded area. 
Since the bank is certain that the non-Hispanic white 
borrower will meet all of his/her mortgage payments, the 
analysis that follows focuses on the bank's lending 
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practices towards Hispanic households that are perceived as 
risky borrowers. 
P<x> 
q (l+Rc)l Q 
Figure 3 The probability of default and possible proceeds 
from a venture. 
Given a loan amount L, the Hispanic borrower owes the 
bank (1 + Rc) L at the end of the period. If x < (1 + Rc) L, 
then the Hispanic borrower is in partial default, and if the 
household ability to meet the mortgage payments increases, 
that is x ~ (1 + Rc) L, then the bank gets paid in full and 
the borrower keeps the difference if any. The bank's 
expected profits from the loan to the risky borrower are 
given by: 
(l+Rc) L (l+Rc) L 
IIe= I xp(X) dx + (l+Rc) L I p(X} dx- (l+Rb) L (3) 
q 0 
The first term in Equation (3) is the bank's expected 
repayment if the Hispanic household is unable to meet its 
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mortgage payments, that is, x ~ (1 + Rc) L. The second term 
is the contracted repayment times the probability that the 
repayment ability of the household would be sufficient to 
repay the loan in full. The last term is the opportunity 
cost of the loan to the lender, where Rb is the certain rate 
of return on alternative investments, say, Treasury bills. 
The optimal loan size (L) to the Hispanic borrower that 
would maximize the bank's expected profit is calculated by 
setting the first derivative of the expected profits (~) 
with respect to (L) equal to zero. 
(4) 
q 
+ (l+Rc) I p(X} dx- (l+Rb) = o 
(l+Rc) 1 
Rearranging gives: 
Q (l+Rc)L 
= I p (X) dx = 1- I p (X) dx (5) 
(l+Rc)L q 
and 
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(6) 
In equation (6), the optimal loan size is the amount 
for which the probability of default equals the present 
value of the excess of the loan rate over the opportunity 
cost of the loan. For example, values of Rc = 0.15 and Rb = 
0.08 induce the bank to extend a loan such that P[default] = 
0.061. As the return of the contract loan rate (Rc) 
increases, the bank is induced to accept a higher 
probability of default. 
By taking the second derivative of the expected profits 
equation (~)with respect to the loan size (L), I can show 
that equations (5) and (6) are consistent with a profit 
maximum for all values of L between q/{1+Rc) and Q/{l+Rc). 
{< 0 for q~ (1 +Rc> L ~Q 
=0 otherwise 
(7) 
The optimal loan size to the risky borrower could be 
expressed as a function of the loan rate by the loan offer 
curve, L = S(Rc). Let's suppose that the lender believes 
that the probability that the risky household would meet all 
of his/her mortgage payments (x) is uniformly distributed 
between q and Q that is: 
fox q ~ x ~ D 
elsewhere 
Substituting Equation (8) into Equation (6) 
(1 + Rc> L 
I _1_ dx = ( 1 + Rc) L - q = Rc - Rb ()-q (} - q 1 + Rc q 
=P [default] 
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(8) 
(9) 
After rearranging, the loan offer function is given by: 
L=S(R ) = q + (Q-q) (Rc-Rb) fox R ... ~Rb (10) 
c 1 + Rc ( 1 + Rc) 2 ... 
Given this loan offer function we can observed that 10 : 
(1) If Rc < Rb; then L = 0 because the bank will not extend 
risky loans at a contract rate less than the certain return 
rate on Treasury bills. 
(2) If Rc = Rb, then 0 ~ L ~ q I (1 + Rc). That is, the bank 
is indifferent between extending the loan and purchasing of 
Treasury bills because the loan is certain to be repaid when 
L ( 1 + Rc) ~ q · 
(3) The bank will extent a loan if the contracted payment is 
10These properties are consistent with those described by 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) . 
smaller or equal than the maximum ability of the household 
to meet its mortgage payments, that is L( 1 + Rc} ~ Q. 
(4} The loan amount approaches zero as the contract rate 
(Rc} goes to infinity. That is, the probability that the 
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borrower will not meet the repayment amount increases as Rc 
increases. 
(5} Equation 7 shows that for a given contract rate, the 
expected profits from the investment decrease as the loan 
deviates from its optimal size. 
(6) Expected profits increase along the loan offer curve as 
Rc increases up to where the repayment amount (1 + Rc) L 
approaches the upper limit of the households. ability to meet 
all mortgage payments (Q). Beyond this point, the bank has 
the incentive to increase Rc while reducing the loan amount 
( L) . 
Theoretical models that explain the impact of 
collateral requirements on credit rationing suggest that in 
the bank's view an increase in collateral requirements has 
two effects on the mortgage market: (1) households that 
decided to stay in the market will choose less expensive 
homes, and (2) low risk, less wealthy borrowers will drop 
out of the mortgage market. The increased collateral 
requirement could significantly increase the second effect, 
thus decreasing the bank's expected returns (Wette, 1983}. 
That is, an individual with wealth W0 , and that is 
required some amount of collateral (C) and to pay an 
interest rate of Rc, expects to obtain a level of utility 
given by: 
[Max Ux (w0 Rb- (1 +Rc) +X> p(X) (11) 
+ U ( ( W0 - C) Rb) ( 1 - p (X) ) ] = V ( W0 ) 
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where: Rb is the return of an alternative investment, x are 
the expected proceeds from the investment and p(x) is the 
probability of success. By partially differentiating V(W0 ) 
with respect to the collateral requirement, I can show that 
this adverse selection more than offset the positive direct 
effect. 
(12) 
Hispanics that are perceived as low wealth/high risk 
individuals an increase in (C) has not adverse selection 
effect, thus the bank returns are increased. But, low 
wealth/low risk individuals would drop out of the lending 
market, thus reducing the bank's expected profits (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1987). 
APPENDIX II 
VARIABLE 
INCOME 
LniNCOME 
MAR 
SEX 
EDUC 
EXP 
EXP2 
HAR 
yp 
YT 
LnYP 
LnYT 
CITY 
AGEl 
BLACK 
HISPANIC 
MINORITY 
FHA 
Tabla 1. Definition of Variables 
DEFINITION 
1989 reported household head income 
Natural log of 1989 reported income 
1 = if household head is married; 0 
otherwise 
1 = if household head is male; 0 otherwise 
household head years of schooling 
= AGE - EDUC - 5 
Experience squared 
Annual housing appreciation rate 
Permanent income 
Transitory income 
Natural log of permanent income 
Natural log of transitory income 
1 = if house is located within the central 
city of a metropolitan area; 0 otherwise 
Household head age/100 
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1 = if household head is black; 0 otherwise 
1 = if household head is Hispanic; 0 
otherwise 
1 = if household head is black or Hispanic; 
0 otherwise 
1 = if mortgage applicant obtained a FHA 
loan; 0 otherwise 
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Table 2. Sample Data Statistics 
VARIABLE STANDARD DEVIATION 
FHA .28 .45 
INCOME 52,088 29,270 
Lnincome 10.70 .61 
yp 52,100 13,300 
YT 0.00 26,100 
LnYP 10.72 .29 
LnYT -.02 .53 
EDUC 14.20 2.63 
EXP 19.68 11.74 
EXP2 524.92 674.67 
MAR . 70 .46 
SEX 1.26 .44 
AGEl . 39 .11 
HAR 1.06 .13 
CITY .16 .36 
BLACK .06 .24 
HISPANIC .06 .24 
MINORITY .12 .33 
Table 3. Mincer Earnings Function 
VARIABLE Dapandant=Incoma Dapendant=Lnincoma 
Coefficients Coefficients 
(t-statistic) (t-Statistic) 
Constant -22,272.42 9.25 
(-6.14)··· (125.97) ... 
EDUC 3,649.21 .07 
(20.48)··· (19.88) ... 
SEX -2,725.06 -.07 
(-2.58). (-3.43) .. 
EXP 1,307.17 .03 (10.96) ... (11.33) ... 
EXP2 -22.02 -.0005 (-10.63) ... ( -12.7 3) ••• 
MAR 17,148.31 .38 (16.79) ... (18.58)··· 
HISPANIC -586.38 -.05 
(-.31) (-1.37) 
BLACK -2,813.80 -.06 
(-1.58) (-1.73). 
Adj. R2 .21 .24 
N 3767 3767 
, • significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Regression Estimates (Dependent Variable m PHA) 
Minority (Hispanics + blacks) 
VARIABLE Coefficient Coefficient 
(t-Statistic) (t-statistic) 
Constant 1.05 2.60 
( 13 .14) *** (7.06)"** 
yp 
-.35 (-4.99) ... 
YT -.15 (-5.47)*** 
LnYP -.16 
(-4.77)*"" 
LnYT -.05 (-3.53)** 
AGEl -.69 -.73 
( -10. 68) *** (-11.24)*** 
SEX -.003 -.005 
(-.15)* (-.26)* 
MAR .01 .013 (.53)* (. 61). 
CITY .04 .04 (2.03)** ( 1 . 97 ) •• 
HAR -.32 -.32 (-5.73)*** (-5.73)* .. 
MINORITY .09 .09 (3.86)*** (3.76)** 
NON-HISPANIC WHITES BASE BASE 
Adj. R2 .057 .052 
N 3, 767 3, 767 
, • significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
42 
VARIABLE 
Intercept 
yp 
YT 
LnYP 
LnYT 
AGEl 
SEX 
MAR 
CITY 
HAR 
MINORITY 
NON-HISPANIC 
x2 
N 
Tabla 5. Estimates of the Probit Model 
Minority (Hispanics + blacks) 
(Dependant Variable = PHA) 
Coefficients Coefficients 
(Standard Errors) (Standard Errors) 
6.751 10.555 
(. 241) (1.003) ... 
-.891 
(.191)"* 
-.433 (.08)""" 
-.394 
(.091)"" 
-.119 (.035)". 
-1.897 -1.992 
(.188)""* (.187)""" 
-.001 -.007 
( . 046) ( . 046) 
.029 .032 
( . 0 53) (. 055) 
.097 .095 
(.051)"* (.051)*• 
-1.053 -1.049 
(.185)*"* ( .184) *** 
.217 .213 
(.057)** (.057)•* 
WHITES BASE BASE 
3,761 3,744 
3,767 3, 767 
, * significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Regression Estimates (Dependent Variable ~ PKA) 
Blacks and Hispanics 
VARIABLE Coefficients Coefficients 
(t-Statistic) (t-Statistic) 
Constant 1.06 2.86 ( 13.29) *** (7. 71) ••• 
yp 
-.39 
(-5.58)*** 
YT -.15 (-5.49)*** 
LnYP -.19 
(-5.48)*** 
LnYT -.05 (-3.55)** 
AGEl -.69 -. 74 ( -10 .82) ••• (-11.46)"** 
SEX -.006 -.009 
(-.34) {-.50) 
MAR .02 .03 
{1.12) (1.30) 
CITY .03 .03 
(1.72)" {1.66)* 
HAR -.31 -.31 {-5.52)* .. (-5.52)*** 
BLACK .18 .18 (6.08)*** {6.06)*** 
HISPANIC -.02 -.02 
{-.52) {-.69) 
NON-HISPANIC WHITES BASE BASE 
Adj. R2 .062 .058 
N 3,767 31767 
, • significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
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VARIABLE 
Intercept 
yp 
YT 
LnYP 
LnYT 
AGEl 
SEX 
MAR 
CITY 
HAR 
BLACK 
HISPANIC 
NON-HISPANIC 
x2 
N 
Table 7. Bstimatea of the Probit Model 
Blacks and Hispanics 
(Dependent Variable = PBA) 
Coefficients Coefficients 
(Standard Errors) (Standard Error) 
6.799 11.352 
(. 243) (1.024) 
-1.02 
( .194) .. 
-.441 
(.081)** 
-.470 
{.093)** 
-.121 
{.036)** 
-1.927 -2.035 ( . 188) ... {.188)*** 
-.011 -.019 
( .047) ( . 04 7) 
.063 .073 
(.054)* (.056)* 
.082 .080 
(.051)** (.051)** 
-1.032 -1.03 
(.186)** ( .185) •• 
. 433 .431 ( .073) •• {.073)** 
-.045 -.056 
(.082) (.083) 
WHITES BASE BASE 
3,766 3,749 
3, 767 3, 767 
, • significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. Regression Estimates (Dependent Variable a PHA) 
Blacks 
VARIABLE Coefficients Coefficients 
(t-Statistic) (t-Statistic) 
Constant .97 2.49 ( 4. 43) ••• (1.98)** 
yp 
-.38 
(-1.37) 
YT -.22 
(-2.59)** 
LnYP -.16 
(-1.33) 
LnYT -.06 
(-1.41) 
AGEl -.64 -.65 (-3.08) .. (-3.11) .. 
SEX -.03 -.04 
(-.54) (-.64) 
MAR .08 .08 
(1.02) (1.05) 
CITY -.01 -.008 
(-.24) (-.17) 
HAR -.26 -.25 (-1.90)* (-1.84)* 
BLACK .22 .23 (4.32)*** (4.25)""* 
HISPANIC BASE BASE 
Adj. R2 .07 .06 
N 451 451 
, · significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
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VARIABLE 
Intercept 
yp 
YT 
LnYP 
LnYT 
AGEl 
SEX 
MAR 
CITY 
HAR 
BLACK 
HISPANICS 
x2 
N 
Table 9. Estimates of the Probit Model 
Blacks 
(Dependant Variable = PHA) 
Coefficients 
(Standard Errors) 
6o450 
( 0 611) 
- o967 
( 0 67 8) •• 
-o6l7 
( 0 229) •• 
-1.613 
(.518)** 
-o072 
( .13 0) 
.187 
(o173)* 
-o028 
(.111) 
-.875 
(.436)** 
.523 
{ .122) .. 
BASE 
443 
451 
Coefficients 
(Standard Errors) 
l0o026 
(3o047) 
-.384 
(.291)** 
-.134 
(o092)** 
-1.590 
(.515)** 
-o081 
( .13 0) 
.199 
(o183)* 
-.017 
( .111) 
-.842 
(o430) .. 
.515 
( . 124) .. 
BASE 
446 
451 
, 
0 
significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
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